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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                   FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON
    CALISTA ENTERPRISES LTD.,
             Plaintiff,
                                 ) 3:13-cv-01045-SI
                                  ) November 19, 2013
       VS.
                                 ) Portland, Oregon
    TENZA TRADING LTD.,
              Defendant.
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                    TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
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              BEFORE THE HONORABLE MICHAEL H. SIMON
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               UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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(November 19, 2013) PROCEEDINGS 3 (Open court:) THE COURT: Good afternoon. 5 COUNSEL: Good afternoon. THE CLERK: Your Honor, this is the time set for 6 oral argument in civil case No. 13-1045-SI, Calista 7 8 Enterprises Ltd, versus Tenza Ltd. For the record, we 9 have by phone Anna Vandenberg (sic), Sean Ploen and 10 Matthew Shayefar. 11 Counsel in court, please identify yourselves for 12 the record. 13 MR. GURVITS: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Val 14 Gurvits for Calista. With me, I have Thomas Freedman. 15 THE COURT: Very well. 16 MR. TAUGER: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Paul 17 Tauger for Tenza. With me is our local counsel, Devon 18 I would like to clarify that it is Anna 19 Vradenburgh with us on the phone. 20 THE COURT: Thank you. 21 All right. We are here on Plaintiff Calista's 22 motion to stay this litigation while the petition for 23 cancellation that is under consideration at the Trademark 24 Trial and Appeal Board proceedings. 25 I have read the materials that you all have

provided to us, including the supplemental exhibit in support of defendant's opposition that was filed yesterday, November 18th, Docket 35.

I do have some questions for both sides, but Calista is the movant. If there is anything you wish to add at this time to what has already been briefed, and you don't need to repeat the briefing, but you are welcome to do so.

MR. GURVITS: Thank you, Your Honor. Just a 30-second synopsis of what happened and why we are all here. My client, Calista, owns 13 domains. For several years they were working together with Tenza in sending traffic from those domains to Tenza's website. At one point Tenza apparently decided that they didn't want to share that revenue and filed the UDRP proceeding. What we did in response is we filed a proceeding for cancellation with the TTAB and then asked for the UDRP proceeding to be stayed until the TTAB resolves the issue whether the "PORNTUBE" trademark is valid or not. Our position is that, at best genericide happened to it. It is simply a combination of two generic claims. Our position is that if that trademark is not a valid trademark, the rest of the case goes away.

THE COURT: Even the common law trademark? If the TTAB rules that it is generic, that would also then

automatically dispose of the common law trademark claim?

MR. GURVITS: We believe it would. We might need to file a motion for summary judgment on it, but, yes, we believe it would be dispositive.

We ended up losing the UDRP proceeding. The one voting in our favor -- arbitrator -- felt the UDRP proceedings should go forward and then they could figure things out. The only way for us then, under the UDRP rules, to prevent the domains from being automatically transferred to Tenza is to file the present action for declaratory judgment, and we did that.

We did that in accordance with UDRP rules, but then we ended up being in a situation where there are two essentially competing procedures going on; one with TTAB and one here. We didn't know which one would go forward. Our feeling is that the TTAB proceeding is certainly less expensive, more efficient, for most judicial efficiency and economy. So we wanted to see, and we continue to want to see the TTAB proceeding going forward.

There is also some case law that we cited supporting the proposition that the issue of validity of the trademark should be decided by the administrative body that issues those trademarks.

Indeed, we filed the other day a motion to extend discovery in the TTAB proceeding, and we did that

because that was last day on which discovery could be served. We don't know which process is going forward, so we have not filed discovery in either case. But again, we feel that this type of dispute lives or dies based on whether the "PORNTUBE" mark is truly valid.

THE COURT: Can you tell me with specificity what discovery has already taken place in the TTAB action?

MR. GURVITS: None whatsoever. We have had some preliminary disclosures and nothing else. Curiously enough, I should mention that neither side took any discovery in the TTAB proceedings. But if this case is not going forward, then, of course, we needed to make sure that we had the opportunity for discovery, which is why we filed the motion to extend discovery.

THE COURT: Am I correct that in the TTAB procedures, absent an agreement by both sides, that a deposition of an out-of-country company or witness is not necessarily going to be taken by oral deposition in person of that witness?

MR. GURVITS: That is my understanding. I am going to ask Sean Ploen to respond to the Court. Sean, do you have a better feeling than I do on this?

MR. PLOEN: Of course. Your Honor, this is Sean Ploen on behalf of Calista. As Attorney Gurvits stated, or indicated, we have about one month to go in the

currently scheduled discovery period at the TTAB. Both sides, as Val said, have served their initial disclosures, which is a condition precedent to service of discovery requests themselves at the TTAB.

To answer your specific question about the manner in which depositions are conducted, it is the case, unless both sides consent to the taking of oral depositions of parties who are located in foreign countries, or unless the Board orders it sua sponte, then depositions in a TTAB proceeding like this one would be taken on written questions as opposed to conducting oral testimony.

THE COURT: Thank you. Am I correct in my understanding that Tenza wants to take the oral deposition of a corporate representative for Calista, not just simply a deposition on written questions, and that Calista's position is to oppose that and insist on a deposition only on written questions? Am I correct in that understanding?

MR. GURVITS: No, Your Honor, we do not oppose in-person depositions. In fact, we have one scheduled -- in the present case we have one scheduled for January 16th. But we would not oppose an in-person deposition.

THE COURT: So whose deposition is scheduled for January 16th, 2014?

MR. GURVITS: It is a 30(b)(6) for Calista.

MR. PLOEN: Your Honor, just to be clear, what is being spoken of right now is the 30(b)(6) deposition in the civil litigation. At the TTAB, we have not yet received a formal request from Tenza as to depositions, and we have had an indication of intent from Tenza as to its intention to take oral depositions. But as noted, that is going to require either consent or a go-ahead from the Board itself.

As Attorney Gurvits said, once we receive that particular request, we are happy to act on it, but we have not taken a formal position in the absence of any kind of formal request from Tenza.

Attorney Gurvits just said, because according to Exhibit D to the declaration of Mr. Tauger, at Docket 30 in this case, page 35 of 56, I see an e-mail from you, Mr. Ploen, to Mr. Tauger dated October 17th, 2013, 8:16 p.m., in which it appears that you are saying or that on behalf of Calista you are taking the position that Tenza will have to move the Board -- move the TTAB -- and show good cause for his preference to take an oral deposition as opposed to a deposition on written questions.

Have I misunderstood my reading of that e-mail?

MR. GURVITS: No, Your Honor, you have not. We

have changed our position since then, since they have served us with the deposition or since they have asked to depose him in this case. We have said, fine, if you want to depose him in person, that's fine. Our internal position was that, having agreed to it in this case, we will agree to it in the TTAB case as well.

THE COURT: What will happen if I stay this case?

MR. GURVITS: I'm on record as promising that we will not oppose an in-person deposition in the TTAB proceeding.

THE COURT: All right. Anything further,

Mr. Gurvits or Mr. Ploen? I have one more question for

you. Could you take me through what will be the prejudice

to Calista if I deny the motion to stay?

MR. GURVITS: We will then be involved in extensive discovery having to do with the counterclaims with the damages, and it is quite a large amount of discovery on issues that, again, I believe would be disposed of if this trademark is canceled.

THE COURT: If the trademark is canceled by the TTAB, does Tenza have the legal right to seek de novo review of that decision before this Court?

 $$\operatorname{MR.}$$  GURVITS: I do not know the answer to that question.

Sean, do you know the answer to that question?

MR. PLOEN: I think it depends in part upon what happens with this particular proceeding in the meantime.

Ordinarily the right of review de novo would go to the federal circuit.

THE COURT: I thought it would go to the federal circuit only if all affected parties wanted it to go to the federal circuit. But if either the petitioner or any other affected party who is a party to the TTAB wants it to go to a district court, it goes to the district court.

Am I mistaken?

MR. PLOEN: No, I don't believe you are mistaken, Your Honor, but I also think it depends in part upon the status of the corresponding civil litigation. In other words, I think there are situations in which the corresponding civil litigation has been stayed, and the parties agree that any appeal of the TTAB decision should go to the federal circuit.

THE COURT: I don't disagree with you there, where you said the parties disagree.

So let me ask you this hypothetical: Let us assume that I stay this action and the TTAB rules in favor of Calista on the trademark cancellation issue; Tenza does not agree -- I'm asking you to assume this for hypothetical purposes -- that that appeal should go to the

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federal circuit, but, instead, would prefer to have me lift the stay and resolve all of the issues in this lawsuit -- all of the issues in this lawsuit that are pending, including reviewing de novo the TTAB decision. Would Tenza have such a right? MR. PLOEN: Are you addressing that question to counsel for Calista? THE COURT: Yes. Either you, Mr. Ploen, or Mr. Gurvits. From the facial expression of Mr. Gurvits, I think he is expecting you would answer that. MR. GURVITS: Or at least hoping. THE COURT: Hoping. MR. PLOEN: Yes, I believe Tenza would have that In other words, I think there is nothing Calista could do to prevent the question from being reviewed by your court, Your Honor. THE COURT: Okay. Now, the last question for Calista, and then we will hear from Tenza. Tenza argues, in opposition to the motion to stay, that if it is right on the trademark cancellation issue, and/or even if it is wrong, it has the right to proceed on other claims, it would suffer irreparable injury if this case were to be stayed by virtue of the delay that would be caused in

having the TTAB decision proceed and then basically

starting fresh, anew and de novo in this court and that

delay then would have continued infringing use, so argues
Tenza, continuing for a longer period of time.

What's Calista's response to that argument?

MR. GURVITS: It is clearly not irreparable harm. I would acknowledge it is harm to the extent that their trademark is valid and that our laches defense doesn't work, then there is harm quantifiable in money damages. Take into consideration the fact that for two years they were working with us, receiving our traffic. Clearly they don't even view that harm on the business-side to be irreparable. To the extent there is harm, it is easily quantifiable in monetary damages.

THE COURT: Go ahead, Mr. Ploen.

MR. PLOEN: If I could just supplement that answer. As well, Your Honor, I would point out that a request for de novo review is different than the granting of a de novo review. I can't say it is common, because I don't think this particular fact pattern arises quite commonly, but I think, certainly in keeping with precedent for a judge finding himself in the position you would be in at that point, to say: You know what, we have had three judges at the TTAB look at this particular question in detail for some time. I am going to exercise considerable deference with regard to the determination that has been made, after presentation of evidence, as to

whether this particular phrase "retained income source identifying capacity" or "source identifying significance."

So in other words, it may be the case that deference will be given to the Board's decision to designate source, but instead we are proceeding then in terms of questions about damages or any related claims.

THE COURT: I understand. Frankly, my hypothetical assumes that Tenza ultimately prevails, because obviously if Tenza is wrong on the merits, it has not suffered any legally cognizable damages.

MR. PLOEN: Right.

THE COURT: But following up on the point that Mr. Gurvits just said, you say easily quantifiable, how do I quantify that? Let's assume we get to that stage, and I find that -- or the TTAB finds that the trademark should not be canceled; that there was infringement. How easy is it for me to quantify the damages?

MR. GURVITS: There is an amount of money that is being made from this traffic. The defendants know what that amount is for two years. They have been looking at the traffic, and they were paying to Calista some money for the traffic. The traffic is easy to track. You know exactly how many people clicked on this button; you know exactly how many people came. So it is possible to see

what kind of revenue Calista received from this traffic.

I should also point the Court at Section 3 of our reply to defendant's opposition where we point out the presumption of irreparable harm does not apply here.

Tenza has not put forth any evidence of irreparable harm.

Without getting into the specifics, there is a very focused argument as to why there is no presumption in this case of irreparable harm. I mean, we're speaking hypothetically right now.

THE COURT: Sure. I understand. If the damages are as easy to measure and as quantifiable without controversy, as you state, why do you think Tenza is asking for an accounting remedy?

MR. GURVITS: Tenza, insofar as I can tell, has thrown the kitchen sink at us. I think Tenza at some point decided it is better to take the domains away than to pay for them, and that's why we are here. I don't have a better answer.

THE COURT: All right. Very good. Thank you very much, Mr. Gurvits.

Who is speaking for Tenza?

MR. TAUGER: Thank you, Your Honor. Where to begin. We have briefed extensively the law that applies. Unlike Calista, we have included in our brief case citations, including quotes. I am going to briefly cover

what the law is, because it has been completely misrepresented here. Calista argues first that the TTAB proceeding --

THE COURT: One second. The folks on the telephone, can you hear sufficiently Mr. Tauger? If not, I will invite Mr. Tauger to speak closer to the microphone or be seated. Can the folks on the telephone hear Mr. Tauger?

MR. PLOEN: Thank you for asking. Yes, I can.

MS. VRANDENBERG: Yes, I can hear.

MR. TAUGER: I forgot I had that national audience. I will speak louder.

Calista is arguing that the TTAB proceeding is somehow dispositive, and that is flat out not the law. I am just going to mention one cite that we cited in our opposition pleading. It is the Estate of Coll-Monge, 524 F.3d 1341 at 1347. I quote, "The registration does not create the trademark." Trademark rights are not the result of a registration. They result from use in commerce of a mark and a consumer association therewith. It is completely wrong and unsupported by any case law to say that cancellation of a registration somehow robs Tenza of trademark rights that have accrued in its mark.

No. 2, Calista is arguing that this Court is somehow not competent to make the determinations as to

whether a trademark has been invalidated because it has become generic. Again, that is not the law. We have cited the law in our opposition brief that says that this Court is absolutely qualified by Congress to make that determination. So that's also not true.

Calista has argued that it is more efficient to litigate this trademark before the TTAB. Tenza has already conducted extensive discovery. We have served interrogatories. We have served an answer and production of documents and other tangible things, and we have served requests for admission. Calista has responded. We have done all of this. We have noticed the deposition of Calista in Prague for January.

I have to address this sudden change of heart that has just been announced to the Court that now they will not oppose our taking the deposition of Calista in person. These kinds of flip-flops, I believe, just go to illustrate that the intent of Calista in this matter is simply to delay this adjudication as long as they possibly can.

Calista is an adjudicated infringer. The UDRP panel, which is the entity vested with both the power and authority to make that determination, found that they infringed our rights. They don't like that decision.

They admit that they filed this proceeding solely so that

they could block the transfer, and this is relevant to their contention that there is no irreparable injury.

First, as a matter of law, they are wrong.

Trademark infringement presumes irreparable harm. That's black letter law. That's in the case law we cited.

Their objection is, well, that case law comes from a preliminary injunction. Well, of course, it does. That's when the issue gets raised. But that is exactly what they achieved by filing the instant action. They were able to block the ordered transferred domain names to Tenza without showing a probability of success on the merits, without posting a bond. They have stonewalled us completely, and we're incurring irreparable harm as a result. It is a de facto preliminary injunction that they achieved.

Finally, the question that I would ask, why did they do nothing on the TTAB proceeding? It was filed back in April. They admit it was filed in an effort, unsuccessfully, to state a UDRP proceeding. Then they did absolutely nothing on it. It is now seven months later, and they are first telling the TTAB that they need an extension of discovery. They argue, I think disingenuously, that they need time to complete discovery. They haven't even commenced discovery.

I would also point out that the burden of proof

is on them in the TTAB proceeding. We have discovery responses that constitute admissions, and we can use them if we have to with the TTAB. They have nothing and cannot meet their burden of proof.

One other thing I have to mention about irreparable injury. Counsel Gurvits stated that we have not introduced any evidence of irreparable harm. It is a presumption. The presumption shifts the burden. They haven't introduced any evidence that we're not irreparably harmed. They are trying to turn the law on its head, and I would submit that they are not doing it successfully.

THE COURT: What's your best estimate of how long it would take before we get a resolution from the TTAB?

MR. TAUGER: Well, I would prefer to defer this to Counsel Anna Vradenburgh. She is the TTAB expert. I am the litigator.

THE COURT: Ms. Vradenburgh.

MS. VRADENBURGH: Your Honor, I think we have (indiscernible; audio very loud.) We currently have a motion before the Board to extend discovery until April, and it is supposed to end in December. So once discovery ends, then we will have a testimony period for both parties. If that doesn't get extended, then I'm guessing we will be looking possibly for a decision sometime in

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2015, depending on how fast the Board actually reviews the
case and issues an order. If there are other delays, then
this could go on even longer than that.
          THE COURT: You said 2015. Did I hear that
correctly?
          MS. VRADENBURGH: Sean, if you disagree with me,
go ahead and speak.
          THE COURT: That's sort of my role, but I was
going to invite Mr. Ploen to do that.
         MS. VRADENBURGH: I'm sorry. I apologize.
          THE COURT: That is where I was going to go
next. Mr. Ploen or Mr. Gurvits.
          MR. PLOEN: Sorry for interrupting. I would say
that, of course, TTAB proceedings can or may last years,
as my sister counsel points out, so can district court
proceedings. I think that the estimates given to you are
on the far side in terms of duration.
          THE COURT: So what's your estimation,
Mr. Ploen?
          MR. PLOEN: I would say by fall of 2014.
          THE COURT: All right. Let me ask both sides
now, and we will start with defendants --
         MS. VRADENBURGH: Your Honor, I don't know if I
would agree with that, simply because once discovery ends,
then there is a 30-day period and then the testimony
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period will begin for the other side. Then there is another 30-day period, and then the testimony period begins for the respondent. Then after that, there will be briefing due. The briefings are usually 60 days after the testimony period has ended, assuming there are no motions filed. So that's April -- we're already into well beyond the fall of next year before the Board would even get briefs.

THE COURT: Thank you, Ms. Vradenburgh. One second, Mr. Ploen. I guarantee everyone here, if anyone has anything they want to say, they will be entitled to say it before we close this proceeding.

First of all, let me say to Ms. Vradenburgh, even though I recognized your voice from the introduction, will everyone on the telephone please state their name before beginning speaking, because that will assist our court reporter here.

Mr. Ploen, did you wish to say something?

MR. PLOEN: This is Sean Ploen. I simply am

noting that we currently have a schedule in place with the

Board which calls for those rebuttal periods to end as of

July 1st, 2014. At that point we would have the briefing

period, as Attorney Vradenburg notes.

So in other words, right now the Board is scheduled to receive its briefs in the fall of 2014.

Decisions can come very quickly, or they can take some time, depending on the complexity of the case and the panel deciding it.

THE COURT: Mr. Ploen, the schedule you are referring to, is that the schedule that right now is currently subject to the motion to extend?

MR. PLOEN: That's right, yes.

THE COURT: That motion was filed by whom?

MR. PLOEN: The motion to extend discovery at the TTAB was filed by Calista. There is also at the TTAB pending a motion to suspend the TTAB proceeding that was filed by Tenza.

THE COURT: I know that. That's not what I asked.

All right. Let me ask, Mr. Tauger, if I were to deny the motion to stay, tell me what remains to be done before discovery can be concluded in this case from Tenza's perspective, and then in a moment I will ask the same question for Calista's counsel.

MR. TAUGER: We will complete the deposition of Calista, and I will say that Calista was quite forthcoming in their written responses to our written discovery. We don't contemplate at this moment any motions to compel in that regard. If their witnesses are forthcoming, then that will probably complete most of the fact discovery

that we would need to do.

I assume that we are both going to identify expert witnesses. It will be the standard expert witness depositions. But as far as I'm concerned, we would be ready for trial very shortly thereafter.

THE COURT: And that's the deposition scheduled for January 16, 2014?

MR. TAUGER: That's correct.

THE COURT: Now, let me ask, whoever wishes to speak for Calista, whether that be you, Mr. Gurvits, or you, Mr. Ploen, assuming I were to deny the motion to stay, tell me what the balance of the nonexpert discovery needed by Calista would look like.

MR. GURVITS: We would need to serve our own interrogatories and document production requests, and there is a deposition we will need to take, I believe, in Spain of the owner of Tenza. So other than that, it would be surveys and all the other standard stuff.

THE COURT: Sure. So if you serve your interrogatories next week and requests for productions, we should see responses by middle of December. If anyone has any discovery disputes, you would be welcome to call my chambers, and I will get on the telephone with you all and resolve them immediately. No need for briefing on that.

We may decide in the telephone call briefing may help, but

no need to file a written motion to compel. Send an e-mail or telephone call to my courtroom deputy, and I will get involved and talk our way through these discovery disputes. Maybe we will need some briefing; maybe we won't. We will talk our way through it. If there is not, you should get your interrogatory answers in December and your documents in December.

If you do that, would you be able to -- let me turn this over to Tenza -- would Tenza be able to produce the witness at some point in the later half or around January 16th, or the latter half of January?

MR. TAUGER: Not only could we do that, but we actually offered to do that, when we spoke to Attorney Shayefar and asked him if he would like to take our witnesses, but he declined.

THE COURT: Okay. Let me also ask both sides the following procedural question, which I think I know the answer, but let me see if anybody disagrees on this. Assuming hypothetically that I deny the motion to stay, we have two corporations that have consented to jurisdiction of this Court: Calista Enterprises, because it filed the lawsuit here, and Tenza Trading, because it filed a counterclaim here. Not only does that mean that you really don't have to, I think, use the Hague Convention for discovery purposes, although it may depend upon some

specifics of the individual country's laws, I'm not aware of any specifics that require that here, and you could very well use and I very well could order you to use the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

That said, if I learn that there are any problems in terms of the scheduling of the timing and/or the place of deposition, I could order the 30(b)(6) of Calista's corporate representative and the 30(b)(6) deposition of Tenza's representative to take place in the District of Oregon in this courtroom while I preside.

Now, I'm not thinking I'm going to do that, unless there are problems and someone wants me to do that.

Does anyone disagree that I have the legal authority to do that? First, plaintiff, Calista.

MR. GURVITS: No, Your Honor. The only issue, to the extent that there are other deponents that are not the 30(b)(6) deponents, then we might have an issue.

THE COURT: I understand.

MR. GURVITS: If I may, Your Honor. I wanted to remind the Court, we wanted to discuss this during the telephone hearing last time, we are in the middle of a large trial in Miami. Right after this, I am on the red-eye back to Miami. I am here to appear in front of you. We would simply not be able to prepare the discovery before we are finished. That was the issue with

scheduling in November and December for the depo. That's why we ended up doing it. But we did respond to the interrogatories, as my brother pointed out. We are not delaying; we are simply involved in another process right now.

THE COURT: Calista filed with the Trademark
Trial and Appeals Board, April 10th, 2013, right?

MR. GURVITS: Correct.

THE COURT: Why didn't Calista take any discovery between April 10th and now?

MR. GURVITS: Specifically because if -- we knew if we lost the UDRP, we would have to file this lawsuit. If we had to file this lawsuit, then there would be possibly double work that we would have to do. It was simply improper for me to be churning my client like that. That's the only reason.

But with respect to my brother's allegations of intentional delay, when we filed this lawsuit, we asked them twice to accept service of process. They refused twice. We ended up having to deal with -- looking for motions for alternative service, and before that, to look at the Hague Convention. We are not intentionally delaying anything. Frankly, they want to do things on an expedited basis, and when we reasonably say no, they accuse us of intentional delay. They should move in the

ordinary course.

THE COURT: The ordinary course in the District of Oregon is fairly rapidly.

All right. Does anyone have anything further to say with respect to the pending motion to stay? First, the movant, Calista?

MR. GURVITS: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: The defendant, Tenza?

MR. TAUGER: Your Honor, if I may just address the point that you made prior to asking your most recent question, which is whether anyone would have any objection to your exercising your discretion for the depositions to take place here.

This was a fight that was brought to us by

Tenza. The only reason that we filed an answer and

counterclaim was because they had blocked transfer of the

infringing domains to us pursuant to the UDRP decision.

I cannot say it is easy or convenient for my clients to come to the United States. Neither of them, to my understanding, are citizens of the United States.

Neither of them reside here.

If I also may address one claim that was made by my brother counsel here, and that is on our refusal to accept service of process. We were advised on June 26th at the TTAB discovery conference that they had

filed the suit. We were not served with it. We had never seen it. In fact, we have never been served. In fact, I think we got it by going on PACER and downloading it. At that point I mentioned I was not authorized to accept service of process, and that was true.

The implication that we are somehow expected to do their litigation for them is truly troubling. We are not obligated to accept service of process. They are the ones who had submitted to the jurisdiction of the UDRP panel, just by registering their domain names. ICANN controls it and ICANN says where it is going to occur.

We filed an answer and, yes, we filed our counterclaim because we think under Rule 19 we had to. Otherwise, we would have to lose our claims. We filed the answer, because we could not continue allowing them to resist the UDRP order just by having gone through the motions of filing the instant action. That's it.

Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Does anyone else wish to speak to the pending motion? Seeing no hands and hearing no voices, I am going to issue a written opinion and order. I may get it out today. If not, you will get it tomorrow, but I'm telling you now that I'm denying the motion to stay.

Now, let's talk about discovery close and the

balance of what needs to be done in this case. It looks to me and sounds to me as if everyone acts reasonably diligently, we can get fact discovery closed by January 31st.

Am I mis-hearing something? First, Calista.

MR. GURVITS: Again, Your Honor, we respectfully request that we be allowed to have some time in formulating our discovery requests, which we simply don't have the bandwidth to do until our trial is over. Our trial is over on December 20th. My entire legal team right now is in Miami. We are buried in this litigation.

When we initially spoke to Tenza regarding a calendar, close of discovery by April seemed to be an idea that everybody was onboard with. So I would propose that discovery be closed by April, which would give us the opportunity to really sit down with our clients, or at least over the phone, and think about the questions that need to be asked and do a good job with it, serve it, give them the opportunity to respond to it and not do it in a rush.

THE COURT: That does sound like it takes too long to me, especially since this lawsuit was filed in June -- I think it was filed June 21st, 2013. I want to see if we can get this resolved by a trial within 12 months from filing.

Let me ask Tenza, when do you propose then? I assume, from what I heard before, that you could live with January 31st. But in light of what Mr. Gurvits has said, and I know counsel have been and want to be reasonably cooperative with each other, what would you suggest for a close of fact discovery?

MR. TAUGER: Your Honor, we would like discovery to close as soon as possible. I understand Mr. Gurvits' concern and his problem. I would say it is up to the Court to determine how to accommodate that. We would like to move along this litigation as quickly as we can.

THE COURT: Well, it seems to me that if you can formulate your discovery requests in mid-December or sometime in December, you are taking your chances that you may not have much time to deal with discovery disputes. But then again, all counsel here, including Mr. Tauger, are getting a sense of how I am going to deal with discovery disputes. So there might not very well be any discovery disputes.

If you serve your discovery request mid-December, you will get responses mid-January. You take your depositions sometime in February. So fact discovery is going to close on February 28th.

If fact discovery closes on February 28th, I think it is reasonable to expect, if there is going to be

any dispositive motions -- you need to do some expert discovery. Fair enough.

So what's your preference? Has each side talked about it? There are two traditional ways of doing expert discovery. One way would be for you each to do simultaneous filings of your expert reports and then a short while later simultaneous filings of any rebuttal expert reports. We can either put expert depositions in between those two periods, or after the rebuttal reports, or we can do it purely sequential.

response, since we have really an atypical situation -normally I would expect a plaintiff to file a report first
in a sequential mode. But here, we really have
infringement claims that are in large part driving a
number of the issues that have to be resolved. It strikes
me, rather than going sequential, the right to do is have
a deadline for the simultaneous filing of expert reports
followed by a short period for expert depositions of each
side -- either that or then followed by rebuttal expert
reports or the depositions take place after rebuttal
reports. That may be best in these circumstances.

Yes.

MS. NEWMAN: Your Honor, Devon Newman. If I might suggest that each party file simultaneously on the

burden of proof for which they have.

THE COURT: Right. That's what I'm thinking.

What I'm thinking about out loud, and I will be glad to take comments from anyone, whether we should hold off expert depositions until after any pending rebuttal reports so that the depositions can focus, not only on the original comments, but also on rebuttal comments. I think that makes sense.

MR. GURVITS: That would be my inclination, Your Honor, so we can have the benefit of seeing both documents before.

MR. TAUGER: Not to be contrary, Your Honor.

The issues in this case, I think, are relatively clearly defined. So to this extent counsel is correct that to a great degree it is going to turn whether or not our mark is generic. Of course, we contend it is not. I don't know that this is an issue where, for example, in a products liability context you would want to have analysis of the suspect of the accused product or something like that. I think this is something that we can each do independently.

Clearly, they are going to produce experts who are going to say: Oh, yes, it is generic and it is descriptive, and clearly we are going to produce experts that say the contrary. I don't know that having rebuttals

are going to be necessary before we can proceed. I would suggest, again, I would like to move forward as quickly as we can.

THE COURT: Certainly, no one has to file a rebuttal report if they don't want to.

I'm even rethinking now what I said in response to Ms. Newman. I'm not sure it should be just simply focused on the parties' issues where they have the burden of proof. I mean, it is pretty clear what each side needs to contend and respond to here.

Let me put the following schedule out to you all and see what you all have to say about it. I think that the fact discovery closes on February 28th, 2014. Within two weeks both sides should submit their opening expert reports. That would be on March 14th.

Each side submits their opening expert reports. Two weeks thereafter, March 28th, each side submits their rebuttal reports expressing what they agree or disagree with the other side. Then I will give you each two weeks to take depositions of each other's experts. So expert depositions need to be completed by April 18th. Then two weeks after that, if anyone wants to file any dispositive motions, motions for summary judgment or partial summary judgment, that would be two weeks thereafter, or May 2nd.

Does anyone think that schedule is either too

slow or too fast?

MR. GURVITS: I think it is a bit fast, Your Honor.

MR. PLOEN: Your Honor, this is Attorney Ploen.

I think in particular the proposed deadlines for dispositive motion seems awfully hard on the heels of the expert work.

MR. GURVITS: To add to that, Your Honor, experts are not parties, and they are not -- we don't control them as much as we control ourselves. It is difficult to be able, without knowing their own schedule, to pin them down to this kind of a schedule.

THE COURT: We have about six months before we need them. So you can contract with them in enough time to see if they can work within your schedule.

Mr. Tauger.

MR. TAUGER: Your Honor, the only concern I have with there being essentially two weeks between the expert depositions and the dispositive motion cut-off is that we have to get transcripts. That can take a little time to prepare. I don't want it to be very much more extended. I think it would be reasonable to have a couple more weeks.

THE COURT: Mr. Ploen and Mr. Gurvits, what were you thinking of in terms of the time to conclude expert

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depositions and when you want to file dispositive motions.
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              MR. GURVITS: Instead of the two-week schedule
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    Your Honor gave us, a month. So in other words --
              THE COURT: You didn't really answer my
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    question. Just generally, do you think three weeks or 30
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    days after depositions to file?
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              MR. GURVITS: 30 days, please.
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              THE COURT: 30 days. Mr. Tauger, that sounds
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    pretty much what you were asking for as well.
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              MR. TAUGER: That's correct, Your Honor. Either
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    5-16 or 5-18.
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              THE COURT: I did hear about Mr. Gurvits wanting
    four weeks between these periods versus two. What's your
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    view on that?
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              MR. TAUGER: I believe the schedule Your Honor
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    has set is absolutely appropriate. Again, we do not want
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    to delay this any further. There is a de facto
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    preliminary injunction against us. We are incurring
    irreparable harm. We want to move.
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              THE COURT: I will give Mr. Gurvits what he was
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    asking for with respect to the 30 days. So 30 days after
    April 18th will put us at dispositive motions being due
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    May 19th.
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              Now, in this court we have -- frankly, under the
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    federal rules, three weeks after dispositive motions are
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due responses are due. So three weeks after May 19th is
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    June 9th. A reply is due two weeks thereafter, June 23rd.
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    Would I be guessing correctly if I said both sides would
    prefer an oral argument?
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              MR. TAUGER: Yes, Your Honor.
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              MR. GURVITS: Yes, Your Honor.
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              THE COURT: I want at least two weeks to prepare
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    for oral argument.
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              MR. GURVITS: I would be happy to agree to a
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    month, Your Honor.
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              THE COURT: Probably July 4th weekend is a mess.
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    That's a pain.
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              Can you do oral argument on Friday, July 11th?
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              MR. TAUGER: That works for us, Your Honor.
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              MR. GURVITS: Yes.
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              THE COURT: Since you are traveling out of town,
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    I am reasonably open that day right now. Would you prefer
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    argument in the morning or in the afternoon? What's
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    easier for your travel?
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              MR. GURVITS: Either way is fine, because I'd
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    come in the night before. It is a three-hour difference
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    for me. For you, it might be an afternoon.
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              MR. TAUGER: For me, it will be morning. I did
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    come in this morning, and it was actually quite a
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    challenge. I got up at 4:00 a.m. to make it. I would
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stay overnight.

THE COURT: What would you all prefer? If you both agree whether you want a 9:30 oral argument or a 1:30 oral argument, if you can both agree.

MR. GURVITS: Let's do 1:30 to make sure we have some time in the morning to prepare.

MR. TAUGER: I was going to suggest 9:30 because I would want to catch a flight back that day.

THE COURT: Would you rather have it 10:30 or 11:00?

MR. GURVITS: Sure. Eleven o'clock would be great, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Oral argument on summary judgment on Friday, July 11th, at 11:00 a.m. By the way, with this schedule, do not expect that if anyone moves to extend the briefing schedule, even if it is unopposed, do not expect it to be granted, because I'm giving myself a relatively tight time here. Now, that said, if someone asks for a one-day extension, that's fine.

By the way, let me tell you too, I have decided I was too loose previously allowing in cases motions to exceed page limits. It is not necessary. You can all live within your page limits. Frankly, it has not improved the quality of briefing, when I get a 50-page brief, that should have been done in 35. Don't plan on

asking for extension of page limits.

I don't think I should schedule anything further past July 11th, but I will tell you this, at the oral argument I might be prepared to rule from the bench. I might not. So please bring your trial calendars to the oral argument on July 11th just in case. It is my plan and expectation to be fully prepared. So we will see where we go on that.

By the way, I assume this is to a jury, correct?

MR. GURVITS: Correct.

THE COURT: Assuming that everything goes forward to the jury, do you have a sense of how many trial days you might all need?

MR. TAUGER: I would really have to think about this a little bit.

THE COURT: That's fine. Will you all make sure you've thought about it. You can answer that question come July 11th.

All right. The one date that I haven't scheduled is the date to file an ADR, or alternative dispute resolution report. Let me ask you for your suggestions of when it should be. Frankly, in a case like this with sophisticated lawyers on both sides, you don't need me to put in an ADR deadline for the most part.

Here is my experience of why an ADR deadline is

not a bad idea: Some lawyers -- and I think they are wrong -- but some lawyers think it is a sign of weakness to discuss settlement, to be the first one to broach the possibility of settlement with the other side. I practiced 30 years before taking the bench two and a half years ago. I think that's wrong. Some lawyers feel that way.

One benefit of an ADR deadline, which has to be filed jointly, it forces the parties to talk settlement and not to simply let that opportunity slip by because neither side wanted to be the first to raise it. So I think it is not a bad idea.

Now, whether or not you have that discussion and you file your ADR report at about the time that fact discovery closes and before everybody puts in the effort and expense of dealing with expert discovery -- that's one possibility -- and that's not a bad idea. In some cases, however, you are better off doing it after the expert depositions have taken place so each side knows where each other is, but before everyone puts the time and money into briefing summary judgment.

So if you both agree, I will give you both what you want. Would you rather have the ADR report due sometime in early March, after fact discovery closes but before you have really put a lot of time and money into

experts? Or would you rather have it due, say, sometime late April or early May before you put the time and money into dispositive motions? What do you all think makes the most sense?

MR. TAUGER: With the understanding that this is not a display of weakness of any kind, I like the earlier date. I think it helps narrow issues.

THE COURT: Calista's counsel?

MR. GURVITS: No objection to that.

March 7th, a week before your expert reports are due but a week after your fact discovery is closed. You don't need to wait until March 7th to broach the topic about what do you want to do about ADR. As the case progresses, if you want to do private mediation or do it the old-fashioned way, lawyers to lawyers, or there are other possibilities.

It probably would not be particularly convenient for you, but I'll give you the offer anyway. We have an outstanding staff mediator in this district. She is a former Oregon Supreme Court justice. Her name is Sue Leeson, and she is an outstanding mediator. She has got superb mediation skills, and she's very, very smart on the law. She is a former state Supreme Court justice, and she is free of charge. Her mediation book books up fairly early. So if you want her, probably the best time to

contact her and reach out is January or so, probably not much later, or you are not going to get her by the March time frame. If you want to go that route, just send an e-mail or call my courtroom deputy, Mary Austad, and we will enter an order simply referring the case to the staff mediator.

That will not stop any our deadlines, but it will at least get you on her dance card, if you will, and you will have that going. Otherwise, you can get your own private mediator, or you can do it without a mediator and talk amongst yourselves.

My style is not to twist anyone's arms to settle. I think that most cases should settle, because it is less expensive and more certain an outcome than not settling. That said, some cases don't settle, and that's totally fine with me.

We were just counting it up this year, 2013. I tried nine trials. One was a bench trial; eight were jury trials. Of those eight jury trials, three were criminal; five were civil trials. We don't mind trying cases here. Frankly, I think when the parties can't resolve it themselves, it is not a bad way to resolve a dispute. So we are willing to try it. I'm not going to twist anyone's arms to settle it, but nor am I going to let this case drag on forever.

And I am totally serious about discovery disputes. If you have a discovery dispute that you can't work among yourselves, obviously we insist that you have a good-faith, meaningful conference with each other where you talk it through. But if you can't resolve it, send an e-mail or phone call to my courtroom deputy, Mary Austad. Tell her you have a discovery dispute. I will make the time to get on the phone and work my way through it.

I will give you have a general sense as to how I approach discovery disputes. Some discovery disputes really have tough legal questions that are associated with them, whether they be privilege issues or other types of legal questions, that's fine. The Court has to decide, and that's what we're here for.

Other types of discovery disputes seem to me to be one side being more unreasonable with the other than the other side is being. My general approach on that is not to split the difference, but to simply agree with whichever side is being more reasonable. That said, I know I have given an over-generalization. If that gives you insight how I approach discovery disputes, it is not a bad idea in front of me to treat it like a baseball arbitration: The one that's most reasonable will probably get what he or she wants.

We will get our opinion and order, if not today,

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then tomorrow.
              But as long as you are all here and/or on the
 3
    phone, is there anything else that I can do to assist you
    all in this lawsuit while we're all here together right
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    now? I will start with counsel for the plaintiff.
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              MR. GURVITS: No, Your Honor.
              THE COURT: Defendant?
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              MR. TAUGER: Nothing further, Your Honor.
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              THE COURT: Anything from anyone on the phone?
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              MR. PLOEN: No, Your Honor.
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              THE COURT: All right. Safe travels. Thank
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    you. Very good.
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              MS. VRADENBURGH: Thank you, Your Honor.
              (Court adjourned.)
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--000--I certify, by signing below, that the foregoing is a correct transcript of the record of proceedings in the above-entitled cause. A transcript without an original signature, conformed signature or digitally signed signature is not certified. 9 /s/ Dennis W. Apodaca December 4, 2013 DENNIS W. APODACA, RDR, RMR, FCRR, CRR 10 DATE Official Court Reporter 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25